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The local business tax as the main revenue source of local governments in Germany has been 
under extensive debate for decades. Proposals for reform range from a broad tax base in the 
sense of an origin-based value-added tax to a pure profit tax that could be implemented as a 
surcharge on corporation and personal income tax. Local business taxation systems in OECD 
countries actually represent the whole spectrum between these two extremes. We use a newly 
developed microsimulation model for the business sector in Germany to analyse the fiscal and 
distributional effects of the general reform options identified, including the extension of the 
local business tax to liberal professionals. We also analyse the effects of the actual German 
business tax reform 2008 with respect to local business tax revenues. 
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Local business taxation has been a constant source of discomfort and critique among policy 
makers, taxpayers and academics for a long time not only in Germany but apparently in many 
countries. Economists have pointed out that local business taxes are often rather a product of 
piecemeal legislation enacted over decades and do not follow clear guidelines of local taxa-
tion such as fiscal equivalence and the benefits principle (see e.g. Studenski (1940) and Testa 
and Oakland (1996) referring to the USA or Maiterth and Zwick (2006) referring to Ger-
many). In Germany, the local business tax is the main source of revenues for local govern-
ments and imposes a considerable burden on enterprises. As the tax largely depends on busi-
ness profits, municipalities are faced with highly volatile tax revenues. Politicians, interest 
groups and economists have proposed various options for reform ranging from a pure profit 
tax to an origin-based value-added tax. The literature weighting the arguments is extensive.2  
In spite of the dimension and importance of the debate, empirical information on the fiscal 
and distributional impact of different local business taxation systems based on micro data is 
scarce. Case studies and showcase calculations have dominated simulation studies of business 
taxation (e.g. Devereux et al. 2002, Spengel 2003). One reason is that detailed and representa-
tive individual firm and tax file data was hardly available, especially about small and medium 
sized enterprises (SME).3 In Germany, fortunately the Research Data Centre of the statistical 
offices has made tax statistics increasingly accessible recently. Another reason for the scarce 
empirical literature is that the behaviour of firms is hard to model as it has many dimensions – 
financing, investment, hiring, incorporation, entry and exit decisions all interact. This may 
explain why the field of microsimulation first covered the household sector, where the main 
economic decisions, labour force participation and work intensity, are more easily modelled, 
and is only slowly expanding into the business sector as researchers are gaining more experi-
ence with microsimulation and computational power is growing at the same time. Maiterth 
and Zwick (2006) used a microsimulation model to assess the impact of two reform options 
for the German local business tax on 253 example municipalities which were selected from 
                                                                          
2 Examples for the German discussion are Döring and Feld (2005), Petersen et al. (2005), Vesper (2004), Fuest 
and Huber (2003), Maiterth (2003), Junkernheinrich (2003), Zwick et al. (2003), Jarass and Obermaier (2003), 
Bach and Versper (2002), Scherf (2002), and Zimmermann (2002). 
3 Data on large corporations has been used for research more often as they are obliged to publish financial 
statements. Discussion Papers   717 
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the total of almost 14,000 municipalities in Germany. While this analysis reveals interesting 
trends, it is not representative.  
In this paper, we describe our newly developed microsimulation model BizTax which is based 
on a representative sample of official individual local business tax and income tax files for 
2001.4 For the first time in Germany, the fiscal and distributional effects of reform options for 
the local business tax can be quantified in detail on the basis of micro data.  
In the section following this introduction, we describe the institutional background in Ger-
many and summarise the discussion around the local business tax. Based on an international 
comparison of local business taxes in OECD countries, we identify basic models of local 
business taxation. These models are discussed in the light of public finance theory. This leads 
to the definition of five fundamental tax reform options for the German local business tax. In 
the third section, we describe the data and the microsimulation model BizTax that we use to 
quantify the effects of these reform options. Section 4 presents the simulation results. The 
microsimulation model allows a precise analysis of the fiscal and distributional effects of the 
reform scenarios by industry, legal form, and by firm size in terms of profit and number of 
employees. Additionally we are able to analyse the impact of the reform on different regional 
categories. For each of the various reform options, we investigate how its implementation 
would redistribute local business tax revenues between cores of agglomeration, surrounding 
areas and rural areas, between western and eastern Germany, and between municipalities with 
high, medium and low local tax revenues per capita. The last section provides a short sum-
mary and conclusion. 
2  Local Business Taxation in International Comparison 
2.1  German local business tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) under discussion 
The German local business tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) has been under extensive debate for dec-
ades. Having its origins in the 19
th century “taxe professionelle”-tradition, it has been as-
signed to the local layer of German fiscal federalism since the 1930s. To this day, the local 
business tax is the main tax source of local governments in Germany (OECD 2006). Origi-
nally, it rested on the pillars “profit before interests” (with adjustments), “capital” and “pay-
                                                                          
4 The data is available at the Research Data Centre of the statistical offices, 
http://www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de. Discussion Papers   717 
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roll”. The idea was to tax a broader base of local value-added. However, over the last decades 
several reforms washed out the tax base increasingly. The optional payroll component was 
discarded in 1980, the addition of interest expenses on long-term debt to the taxable income 
was reduced by half in 1984, and the business capital tax was abolished in 1998. Since its 
early days, the tax has exempted liberal professions such as physicians, lawyers, architects, 
and journalists, as well as farmers.  
Today, the main source of the local business tax base is the operating profit attributed to the 
local jurisdiction. Therefore, received dividends are not subject to tax, and, correspondingly, 
losses from shareholdings are not allowed to be set off against taxable income. Moreover, the 
tax base is augmented by half of the interest expenses on long-term debt. Based on the result-
ing taxable income, the local business tax is determined in two steps. In the first step, the 
taxable income is multiplied by a basic federal tax rate (“Messzahl”) of 5 % (in 2007) in order 
to obtain the uniform basic tax. Unincorporated firms, in particular SMEs, benefit from an 
allowance of €24,500 and reduced basic federal tax rates up to a taxable income of €72,500. 
The uniform basic tax is allocated to the local jurisdictions involved. In the second step, the 
local jurisdictions apply a multiplier, which they are entitled to determine, to their allocated 
share of the uniform basic tax. These multipliers range from a minimum rate of 200 % to 
about 500 % in high-performing agglomerations such as Munich or Frankfurt. Taking into 
account that the local business tax liability reduces its own tax base as deductible expense, the 
effective local tax rates range from the minimum rate of 9 % to almost 20 % in 2007. The 
average rate is about 16 %. Sole proprietors and partners of non-incorporated firms can credit 
parts of the local business tax against their personal income tax in a lump sum. 
Thus, the local business tax imposes a rather high tax burden in particular on incorporated 
companies that do not benefit from the allowance, the reduced tax rates on low income and 
the income tax credit. Corporations account for almost 60 % of the tax revenue, which is 
highly concentrated on big and highly profitable enterprises. The local business tax rates con-
siderably contribute to the high statutory tax rates on business profits in Germany, which are 
among the highest in Europe. Consequently, the main intention of the federal government’s 
recent business tax reform, which will come into effect on January 1
st 2008, is to significantly 
reduce this high tax rate and broaden the tax base. 
Besides the critique against high tax rates from the perspective of national economic policy 
there is a long-lasting discontent with respect to the requirements of local public finance. Discussion Papers   717 
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Local politicians and administration prefer revenue-stable taxes in order to provide public 
services continuously. As the local business tax is predominantly levied on business profits, 
the local tax revenue strongly depends on the business cycle. Borrowing limits are stricter for 
local authorities than at the state or federal level, which makes it difficult for them to borrow 
during recessions and smooth expenses over the business cycle. Therefore, local politicians 
often cut investment and other discretionary outlays in recessions and are tempted to spend 
generously during boom periods, partly because they may hope for a bail-out in a possible 
subsequent financial crisis. The combination of volatile local tax revenues and these politico-
economic circumstances often leads to a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Moreover, as most SMEs are exempted due to the allowance or pay only little tax due to the 
progressive tax schedule for non-incorporated firms, the tax revenue in a single municipality 
often depends on the economic performance of a small number of large enterprises and may 
be hit hard by the downturn of an industry dominating the regional economy. This leads to a 
pathological fiscal impairment in old industrial regions fighting with structural change, in 
particular in eastern Germany. Fiscal equalisation schemes of the federal states have to adjust 
for this via grants. Thus, the current tax scheme conflicts with central elements of local fiscal 
autonomy and fiscal federalism. 
German local governments stick to the local business tax nonetheless. It is the main local 
revenue source that provides a considerable degree of fiscal autonomy. The land tax is also 
under the discretion of local governments, but due to an outdated assessment of real estate the 
tax base is weak and local politicians refrain from raising tax rates for landlords and dwellers. 
The local governments receive a share of income tax revenue, but are not entitled to set the 
tax rate. Local governments and their lobbyists suggest to “revitalise” the local business tax 
with respect to the tradition of taxing a broader base of local value added. In particular, they 
propose to fully add to taxable income all kinds of interest expenses and other financing costs 
such as leasing rates or royalties (Maiterth and Zwick 2006). This prompts strong resistance 
from the business community and their organisations which fear a higher tax burden on cost 
elements. They try to use the opportunity to dismiss the, as they see it, outdated local business 
taxation system and suggest to replace it by a local surcharge on the personal and corporate 
income tax liability. Both sides carry heavy political weight. A reform of local business taxa-
tion as the central part of a more general reform of the local public finance institutions failed 
in 2003, not bringing together these opposite positions (Junkernheinrich 2003). Discussion Papers   717 
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The recently adopted German business tax reform 2008 only includes minor changes to the 
local business tax. The main goal of the reform is to lower the overall statutory tax rate on 
corporate profits to below 30 %. Besides the reduction of the corporation income tax to 15 %, 
the basic federal tax rate of the local business tax will be lowered from 5 % to 3.5 % and the 
reduced basic tax rates for enterprises with low profits will be abolished. At the same time, 
the deduction of the local business tax from its own tax base as well as from corporate and 
personal income tax will be eliminated.5 Moreover, the reform provides tighter provisions 
against tax planning schemes and repeals the declining-balance method of depreciation. The 
tax base of the local business tax is further affected by a modified addition of interest ex-
penses: The addition of half the interest expenses on long-term debt is replaced by the addi-
tion of 25 % of all interest expenses including the estimated interest portion of rents, leasing 
rates and royalties in as much as they exceed an allowance of €100,000. Thus, the reform 
basically aims at the urgent needs to improve the competitive position of the German business 
location in international tax competition and to reduce the incentives for tax planning (Bach, 
Buslei and Dwenger 2007). A fundamental reform of local business taxation and of local 
public finance institutions remains at the top of the agenda.  
2.2  Lessons from public finance theory and international 
comparison 
What can economists contribute to cut the Gordian knot of reforming German local business 
taxation? In the following section, we briefly recall what public finance theory and practice 
might tell us about a reasonable tax assignment to municipalities. This is illustrated by an 
international comparison of local taxation systems, in particular on the business sector (Tables 
1 and 2).  
The basic idea behind fiscal federalism theories is “fiscal equivalence” (Olson 1969, Bird 
1999): If there are public services that benefit certain regions or groups, the pertinent benefi-
ciaries shall decide on their quantity and quality but at the same time pay for it. This prompts 
citizens and firms to reveal their preferences and put some pressure on local governments for 
the efficient provision of public services. Where specific beneficiaries of public services can 
                                                                          
5 For sole proprietors and partners of non-incorporated firms this is compensated by a higher lump sum credit 
against the personal income tax. Discussion Papers   717 
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be identified, user charges are the preferred option. However, they are often ruled out for 
technical reasons or due to transaction costs. In these cases, taxation has to carry out the job.  
Local taxes are typically based on immobile components to ensure that the local beneficiaries 
bear the tax burden. All of the main OECD countries listed in Table 1 raise a land or property 
tax that is usually levied on the whole real estate value including residential buildings as well 
as plants and other commercial buildings. Moreover, the international comparison shows that 
in several countries local governments are endowed with some discretion to tax business 
properties as well as the resident population’s income. In particular the German tradition in 
local public finance theory and practice highlights local firms and residents as the two main 
consumer groups of local public services (Zimmermann 2002). Correspondingly, both groups 
may contribute to the local budget via specific taxes in order to balance the different claims 
for public services. However, it is difficult to apportion the share between both groups prop-
erly since the main public services of the municipally benefit both groups, e.g. transportation 
infrastructure or secondary education. Thus, the idea of sharing the local tax burden between 
firms and residents can only serve as an institutional yardstick for political decision making. 
Table 1  Tax Base and Revenue of Local Business Taxes













Germany  99 1.3 50.0  9
France 9 1.3 26.4  99
Belgium 99 9
Netherlands 9




Luxembourg 9 1.7 91.3  9
United Kingdom 9
Ireland 9
Italy 999 2.3 33.4  9
Spain 9 0.2 1.6  9





Hungary 999 1.5 65.0  9
Norway 9
Switzerland 99 0.5 10.9  99
Turkey 9
United States 999999 0.0 1.0  99
Canada 9




















1) Business taxes with considerable discretion over the tax revenue assigned to the local government, in particular the right to set the tax rates at least in certain 
limits.- 2) Excluding property tax revenue from plants and other business assets. 
Sources: Mennel and Foerster (2006), OECD (2006), European Commission (2007), IBFD (2007).
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Table 2  Local and Regional Business Taxes
1) in Selected OECD Countries 
Designation Taxpayer Tax Base Tax Rate





Local operating profit plus half the 
interest expenses on long-term debt. 
Allowance of Euro 24,500 for non-
incorporated firms
9% - 20%,   
average: 16.3%  
lower rates for 
small firms
France Taxe professionelle (local 
business tax)
Business enterprises and 
professionals, excluding 
farmers
Local fixed assests rental value, 
reduced by 16%





Entrepreneurs or other 
employers subject to VAT
Wage expenses, low threshold for 
small firms
3%





Local operating profit.                            
Allowance of Euro 40,000 for non-
incorporated firms and Euro 17,500 for 
incorporated firms
6% - 9%
Italy Imposta regionale sulle 
attività produttive - IRAP 
(regional business tax)
Entrepreneurs, non-profit 
organizations and public 
bodies
Local net value added from the 
provision of goods and services 
(substraction method), wage expenses 
for non-profit organizations
Standard rate 
4.25%, region’s     
discretion of +/- 
1%-point
Portugal Surcharge on corporation 
income tax (CIT)
Corporations subject to 
CIT
Local share of CIT liability 0% - 10%
Hungary Helyi iparűzési adó (local 
business tax)
Entrepreneurs Local gross value added (substraction 




   Canton de
   Genève 
Taxe professionelle (local 
business tax)
Business enterprises and 
professionals, excluding 
farmers
Local business sales, rental fee of 
fixed assets, number of employees
   Other cantons Surcharge on national 
corporation income tax 
(CIT)
Corporations subject to 
national CIT
Local share of CIT liability
Spain Impuesto sobre 
actividades económicas 
(local business tax)
Business enterprises and 
professionals, excluding 
farmers
Industry sector and floor space used, 
number of employees, electricity 
consumption. Exemption up to a  
turnover of Euro 1,000,000
United States Various types:surcharge 
on national CIT and PIT, 
franchise (income) tax, 
property tax on business 
fixed assets
Enterprises subject to PIT 
or CIT
Local share of business income or CIT 
liability, partly wage expenses, fixed 
assets, or equity capital
usually 1% - 2% 
(local CIT 
surcharge)
Canada (provinces) Capital tax Incorporated enterprises Equity capital 0.3% - 0.5%
Japan Enterprise Tax Business enterprises and 
professionals, excluding 
farmers
Local operating profit 3% - 12%
Country
1) Business taxes with considerable discretion over the tax revenue assigned to the local government, in particular the right to set the tax rates at 
least in certain limits.
Sources: Mennel and Foerster (2006), OECD (2006), European Commission (2007), IBFD (2007).
 
 
Beyond the land tax, the international comparison displays a wide range of local or regional 
business taxation systems. Nearly all conceivable combinations of the different production 
factors can be found as the tax base. From this variety of taxation systems some general mod-
els can be identified.  Discussion Papers   717 
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•  A local profit tax exists in Luxembourg and Japan. Luxembourg raises a kind of “Gewer-
besteuer” historically adopted from Germany which is, however, based on operating profits 
only. Japan levies a local enterprise tax on local business profits. 
•  In some countries there are local rates to the national corporation income tax. Examples 
are Portugal, Switzerland, and the USA. These local rates are levied on the profit share ap-
portioned to the local jurisdiction, usually allocated by a formula using payroll, sales, capi-
tal, or a weighted index of these factors. In the USA, the state and local franchise taxation 
systems often extend or replace the corporation income tax base by elements of capital or 
payroll.  
•  Austria transformed its former “Gewerbesteuer” adopted from Germany to a local payroll 
tax during the nineties. The payroll is taxed at 3 % without any discretion of the local gov-
ernment over the tax rate. 
•  Taxes on business capital are in place in France, in the Canadian provinces, and in the 
USA. The historical “taxe professionelle” has survived to this day in France as a local 
business tax on fixed assets, measured by the rental value. The former payroll component 
of the tax was phased out until 2003. The Canadian provinces levy taxes on the equity 
capital of incorporated firms. In the USA, the state and local franchise taxation systems of-
ten include a capital component. Moreover, many local property tax systems in the USA do 
not only tax real estate including commercial buildings but also fixed assets such as ma-
chinery, motor vehicles, or other equipment.  
•  A tax on local value added exists in Italy and Hungary. Both countries use the subtraction 
method to define the value added, i.e. sales revenues minus operating expenses on the pur-
chases of goods and services. In contrast to the national VAT that is applied in nearly all 
OECD countries as a tax on final consumption, this value-added tax is origin based and 
thus does not provide an input tax credit, and exports to outside the jurisdiction are not ex-
empted. The tax base of the Italian IRAP goes beyond the mere cash flow base of the na-
tional VAT by providing depreciation allowances for investments in fixed assets and ac-
counting for capital gains and losses on operational assets. Hungary applies a gross cash 
flow base: neither expenditures for investment goods nor depreciation allowances can be 
set off against the tax base.   Discussion Papers   717 
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•  Finally, there are local business taxes that are levied on various business properties, e.g. 
floor space used, number of employees, electricity or energy consumption. Spain has such 
a taxation system, similar forms of local business taxation exist in the Swiss canton of Ge-
neva, Belgium, and other countries. These taxes and charges usually do not raise consider-
able revenues, however.  
The revenue impact reported in Table 1, which we derived from the OECD revenue statistics 
(OECD 2006), only includes pure business taxes. It does not include revenues from land or 
property taxes falling on business properties as the statistics do not allow distinguishing be-
tween the shares of the business and the private spheres. Thus, the reported revenue shares 
underestimate the overall local tax burden on business properties. In many countries, local 
land or property taxes charge a much higher tax burden on real estate than in Germany. Par-
ticularly, in most states of the USA the local property taxes extend to a wider range of fixed 
assets (see above), so the tax revenue is considerably higher than the reported one which 
arises from the local franchise taxes.  
2.3  Reform options for Germany 
What does this discussion imply for a local business tax reform in Germany? First of all, the 
share of the local business tax in the overall tax burden appears rather high in international 
comparison, even if one takes into account that the share of property tax revenues that falls on 
enterprises may be considerably higher in many other countries. On the other hand, German 
local Governments normally provide a rather high standard in infrastructure and other public 
services. If politicians decide to carry out a more or less revenue-neutral tax reform, the ques-
tion remains how to rebuild the tax base.  
In any case, liberal professionals and farmers should be included in local taxation. The ex-
emption of these sectors, which has survived since the 19
th century, is contrary to the benefits 
received principle, as liberal professionals typically use public services in the same way as 
other self-employed especially in the service sector (Bach, Broer and Fossen 2007). Further-
more, it might be considered to include non-profit organisations or even state and federal 
public bodies, which also benefit from local public services, in the tax base. This is the case in 
Italy, for instance. Discussion Papers   717 
2 Local Business Taxation in International Comparison 
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The first reform option is to transform the local business tax to a pure tax on business profits 
as in Luxembourg and Japan. This system meets the claims of the business community not to 
tax cost elements and to restrain from a higher tax burden on economic ability. They argue 
that the taxation of cost components such as interest and wage expenses can cause liquidity 
problems for companies during periods of low profits or losses and thus hamper the recovery 
of companies in trouble. Risky investments become less attractive as enterprises have to pay 
taxes even in case of failure. Another argument to tax local profits may derive from the theory 
of economic geography (e.g. Baldwin et al. 2003, Baldwin and Krugman 2002), which dis-
cusses the existence of location-specific rents. Such rents may, however, also appear as higher 
wages for managers and high-qualified specialists. Moreover, it is technically difficult to skim 
rents by taxes on extra profits or wages. In general, it is rather complicated to determine the 
local profit of a subsidiary or an establishment of a firm operating supraregionally or even 
internationally. In these cases the taxable income of the entire company or tax group is usu-
ally assessed at the national level and allocated to the sub-national jurisdictions by formula 
apportionment. As this formula uses payroll, sales, capital, or other business properties the 
apportionment transforms the local profit tax into a tax on these production factors (Gordon 
and Wilson 1986). A further disadvantage of a local profit tax is the high volatility of reve-
nues. If it is argued that the government rather than the private sector should provide insur-
ance against cyclical fluctuations in the tax base, this task should be fulfilled at the federal 
level rather than the local level, as experience shows that local governments often fail to 
smooth expenditures due to stricter borrowing limits and politico-economic reasons. 
This speaks in favour of a broad-based business taxation at the local level, which has been the 
second wing of the German reform discussion for many years. The tax base could be extended 
to interest expenses and other financing costs as well as the payroll. Taxing all income com-
ponents would lead to a tax on local net value added like in Italy. This would imply neutrality 
with respect to the input production factors. The other alternative is a tax on business prop-
erty, obviously measured by real estate, plant, or equipment that could be easily assigned to 
the local jurisdiction. All these broad-based taxation systems would however imply a shift of 
the tax burden to the taxed production factors, in particular to those which are less mobile if 
the tax burden does not meet higher productivity at the location. 
To sum up, we define five fundamental tax reform options for the German local business tax.  Discussion Papers   717 
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1. Integration of liberal professionals and farmers in the local business tax. They are also 
included in the following reform options 2-5. 
2. Local business income tax: pure profit tax.6 Like in the actual business tax reform 2008, 
but in contrast to the other scenarios considered here, this tax is not deductible from its 
own tax base, because it is not considered a cost component. 
3. Local comprehensive business income tax (CBIT): tax on profits and all interest expenses, 
rents, leasing rates and royalties.7 
4. Local business value-added tax: additionally to the CBIT, the tax base includes the sum of 
wages and salaries.8 
5. Local property tax: The tax base comprises 10 % of the fixed assets of an enterprise, which 
can be interpreted as a hypothetical rate of return on business capital. 
We simulate the fiscal and distributional effects of each of these reform scenarios using our 
microsimulation model BizTax. The law of 2007 is the starting point for the definitions of the 
reform scenarios. Deviating from this, we assume that the reduced federal basic tax rates for 
enterprises with low profits are abolished, as in the actual business tax reform 2008. The al-
lowance is left unchanged, except for the business value-added tax; here it is increased be-
cause of the substantially broader tax base. Specifically, it is set at a level that exempts the 
same share of firms with a positive tax base from the tax as if the actual law of 2007 was 
applied (almost a third). Finally, for each reform scenario we determine the federal basic tax 
rate which makes the reform neutral with respect to total local business tax revenue. Addi-
tionally, we also simulate the effects of the actual German business tax reform 2008, but 
without the changes regarding the determination of profits due to a lack of data (see sec-
tion 4).  
                                                                          
6 This reform option could also be implemented as a surcharge on corporation and personal income tax, as 
advocated by the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and the German Chemical Industry Association (VCI) 
(2001). 
7 A similar reform (“Kommunalmodell”) was proposed by the German local authority central organisations 
(Bundesvereinigung der kommunalen Spitzenverbände 2003). 
8 Compare the discussion of an origin based value-added tax (“Wertschöpfungsteuer”) by Bach and Vesper 
(2002). Discussion Papers   717 
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3  Microsimulation Model for the Business Sector 
Microsimulation models have developed to increasingly capable tools for the ex-ante analysis 
of fiscal and distributional effects of tax and social policy reforms. The prerequisite is a repre-
sentative micro data basis of relevant agents such as individuals, households or firms. The 
models simulate the effect of a given policy reform for each individual agent and find the 
overall fiscal effect by aggregation, which can be split by group characteristics such as in-
come classes or industries to analyse the distributional effects. While microsimulation models 
for household taxation are increasingly available, e.g. EUROMOD for several EU countries 
(Lietz and Mantovani 2007) or STSM for Germany (Steiner et al. 2005), empirically based 
microsimulation models for the business sector are still rare, partly due to limited data avail-
ability. Examples for research in this area are models developed for the UK and Italy in the 
context of the EU commission’s DIECOFIS project (Parisi 2003). 
This section introduces our newly developed microsimulation model BizTax for business 
taxation in Germany. It is based on individual firms’ official local business tax files. Thus, it 
represents the heterogeneity of enterprises in Germany with respect to key variables. We use 
the latest data wave available which consists of tax files for the year 2001.9 This data base 
enables us to calculate each firm’s local business tax liability. After having corrected a few 
cases with obviously erroneous data, the simulated tax liability for 2001 equalled the actual 
tax liability for that year given in the data in 99.978 % of the firms; the remaining firms were 
negligible in terms of their tax liability. After this initial data editing, we drew a 10 % strati-
fied random sample (247,314 observations) from the full set of local business tax files to 
make the computationally intensive simulation and further analysis manageable. As large 
enterprises have a potentially high impact on total local business tax revenues (with or with-
out a reform), a higher sampling probability was chosen for enterprises with either a higher 
local business tax base in 2001 or, more generally, with a higher value added from business. 
The biggest enterprises were completely included in the sample. 
The local business tax statistics provide all the variables needed to simulate each firm’s local 
business tax liability for the governing law from 2001 to 2007.
10 They also include the wage 
                                                                          
9 The next wave of official local business tax statistics will cover 2004. 
10 The deduction of the local business tax from its own tax base is calculated using the iteration method, which is 
flexible with regard to tax reforms. Discussion Papers   717 
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expenses and the value of fixed assets, which are important to simulate the local business 
value-added tax and the local property tax.11 
As mentioned in section 2.3, liberal professionals and farmers are exempted from the local 
business tax today and are therefore not included in the local business tax statistics. We use 
information about individuals with income from a liberal professional or farming activity 
from a representative 10 % stratified random sample from the official personal income tax 
(PIT) files for 2001. The task was to generate data sets which represent the firms of these 
individuals in order to add them to our data base. If the liberal professional or farmer is oper-
ating alone, the profit of the firm equals his or her individual income from the mentioned 
activities which is given in the PIT files. These files also inform if a taxpayer is active in a 
business partnership, but not how many parties are involved. To generate a corresponding 
data set representing a partnership in such a case, we assigned a number of parties to it ran-
domly in a way that replicates the distribution of the number of parties in partnerships in 
Germany. The distribution was obtained from statistics about partnerships in Germany (Fed-
eral Statistical Office 2001). We adjusted the generated partnership’s sampling weight accord-
ing to the number of partners and its profit assuming that it was distributed uniformly over the 
partners within the partnership. Furthermore, the PIT files lack some information necessary to 
calculate the local business tax base, e.g. interest expenses. These variables were imputed 
from groups of comparable firms included in the local business tax statistics.12 Finally we 
drew a 10 % stratified random sample again, analogously to our sample from the local busi-
ness tax statistics, and added 124,166 observations representing the firms of the liberal pro-
fessionals and farmers to our data base. 
Using the combined data base, we want to simulate the effects of different tax reform options 
in the year 2008, the year the actual German business tax reform comes into effect. Thus, the 
cross sectional data for 2001 must be updated to reflect the situation of German enterprises in 
2008. We identify changes in the German business sector’s composition with respect to indus-
tries and legal forms using the yearly turnover tax statistics. This allows us to adjust the 
                                                                          
11 A number of firms obviously did not fill in information on these two variables correctly, however. The tax au-
thorities did not make inquiries in these cases, as these items were not needed for the tax assessment. Thus, we 
replaced implausible extreme values with imputed values following Zwick (2006). Furthermore, rents, leasing 
rates and interest expenses for short term liabilities are not included in the data and were imputed as in Zwick et 
al. (2003). 
12 As firms with cost structures comparable to liberal professionals we drew on business, tax and engineering 
consultancies, as far as they are included in the local business tax statistics, as well as insurance agents. For 
farmers the manufacturing sector was used. Discussion Papers   717 
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weights of the firms in the data base such that it represents the changed proportions in the 
population with respect to these characteristics. Furthermore, the relevant variables such as 
profits and interest expenses are scaled up to reflect the changes in the corresponding aggre-
gates reported by the national accounts (Federal Statistical Office 2001-2006) and the corpo-
rate balance sheet statistics (Bundesbank 2004-2007). The German government’s medium 
term projection (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 2006) is used for extrapola-
tion after 2006. 
Based on the edited and extrapolated data, we use the microsimulation model to simulate the 
reform options discussed in section 2.3 for the year 2008, including the main components of 
the business tax reform 2008.13 The law of 2007 (before the business tax reform 2008) is used 
as the reference scenario for the determination of the fiscal and distributional effects of the 
reform scenarios. This allows us to compare the effects of the business tax reform 2008 with 
the other reform scenarios. 
The strengths of microsimulation models such as BizTax are the detailed implementation of 
the tax legislation and reform options, the representative incorporation of the real world’s 
heterogeneity, and the ability to split the fiscal effects of tax reforms by detailed group char-
acteristics. The model currently does not predict behavioural responses of companies which 
may be triggered by tax reforms, e.g. changes in financing and investment decisions or entry 
and exit. The simulation results can thus be characterised as first round effects, i.e. before 
firms may adjust their behaviour. As such behavioural responses normally take some time, 
this approach is especially suitable for short term analyses. Further, the model can determine 
the fiscal effects of assumed behavioural responses.  
4 Empirical  Results 
Table 3 shows the fiscal and distributional effects of the reform options for local business 
taxation which we discussed in section 2.3. The leftmost column displays the local business 
tax revenue in millions of euro if the law of 2007 is applied to the extrapolated data for 2008. 
This is the reference scenario. The six columns to the right show the increase or decrease of 
                                                                          
13 In case of consolidated companies, the local business tax statistics only report the tax base of the subsidiaries, 
but not its components (profits, long term interest expenses etc.). To translate the effects of a tax reform (and also 
of the extrapolation) to the subsidiaries, we adjust their tax base proportionally to the change in the tax base of 
non-consolidated companies (separately for different industry groups). Discussion Papers   717 
4 Empirical Results 
 16
the revenue relative to the reference scenario if the respective reform option were in effect in 
2008.14 The table splits the overall fiscal effect by categories of profit before tax, number of 
employees, industries and legal forms.  
First of all it is interesting to look at the revenue distribution if the law of 2007 is applied. 
73 % of the revenue comes from enterprises with profits above € 1 million, and still 57 % 
from those above € 5 million. Consistent with this, 57 % of the revenues stem from corpora-
tions. Partnerships account for almost a third of local business tax revenues, which reflects 
their high significance in Germany. Revenues from companies with losses are negligible in 
spite of the addition of half of the long-term interest expenses to the tax base. The revenue 
distribution gives support to the view of the German local business tax as a tax for corpora-
tions with high profits. If the company size is measured in terms of the number of employees, 
however, revenues are distributed quite uniformly across the classes. This indicates that firms 
with a large number of employees do not necessarily realise high profits. 
For the actual business tax reform 2008 the simulation results indicate a decrease in local 
business tax revenue of 9.2 % in comparison to the law in 2007. The modified rules for the 
determination of taxable profits are neglected, however, since reliable data, in particular con-
cerning cost accounting, are not available. The Federal Ministry of Finance estimates that the 
business tax reform 2008 does not change the overall local business tax revenue if all meas-
ures are taken into account (Bundestag 2007).15 The distribution of the simulated revenue 
effects by profits before taxes shows that primarily highly profitable corporations benefit from 
the reduction of the basic federal tax rate from 5 % to 3.5 %. Companies with losses pay more 
local business taxes due to the changed rules for the inclusion of financing expenses. Signifi-
cantly more revenue is levied on small firms with less than 10 employees or profits between 
the allowance of €24,500 and €72,500 because of the abolishment of the reduced basic tax 
 
                                                                          
14 In this paper, we only consider the local business tax (“Gewerbesteuer”, sometimes also called “Trade Tax”) 
and not its effects on the corporation income tax and the personal income tax (PIT) through its deductibility as a 
business expense and the lump sum credit against the PIT of sole proprietors and partners of non-incorporated 
firms. In general, a higher (lower) local business tax leads to lower (higher) revenues from these federal taxes. As 
a minor share of the PIT revenues is allocated to local jurisdictions, the local fiscal impact of reforms of the local 
business tax would partly be compensated. Financial equalisation schemes between the jurisdictions of the local, 
state and federal levels are not considered in this analysis either. They would lead to a further levelling of the 
distributional effects. 
15 Not considering the corporation and personal income tax and financial equalisation. Discussion Papers   717 
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Table 3  Revenue Effects of Reform Scenarios of the Local Business Tax in 2008  


































 37 777  - 9.2   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Enterprises Reporting Losses, Total   245  + 27.5  - 15.3  - 45.5  + 798.5  +3 902.6  +2 334.3 
Under - 1 000 000   164  + 21.0  - 17.0  - 38.7  + 734.8  +3 121.9  +2 107.3 
- 1 000 000  - -  250 000   40  + 33.3  - 12.7  - 48.2  + 693.3  +4 386.6  +1 782.7 
-  250 000  - -  50 000   22  + 49.5  - 8.6  - 58.9  +1 184.3  +6 308.5  +4 162.4 
-  50 000  - 0   19  + 46.5  - 14.2  - 83.2  +1 118.9  +6 813.3  +3 309.2 
Enterprises Reporting Profits, Total  37 532  - 9.4  + 0.1  + 0.3  - 5.2  - 25.5  - 15.3 
   0  -   25 000   218  - 17.8  - 18.5  - 37.1  + 115.0  +1 100.5  + 202.8 
  25 000  -   50 000   507  + 67.1  + 127.0  + 113.2  + 158.5  + 121.8  + 140.3 
  50 000  -   100 000  1 544  + 31.6  + 94.3  + 91.4  + 92.9  + 20.3  + 24.8 
  100 000  -   250 000  3 078  - 4.0  + 70.3  + 70.0  + 56.6  + 51.2  + 36.6 
  250 000  -   500 000  2 285  - 13.1  + 48.3  + 48.0  + 35.2  - 8.4  + 23.7 
  500 000  -  1 000 000  2 287  - 15.0  + 14.4  + 13.9  + 5.0  - 20.5  - 18.0 
 1 000 000  -  5 000 000  6 033  - 14.8  - 12.1  - 12.4  - 18.9  - 33.9  - 27.8 
 5 000 000 and more  21 579  - 12.3  - 22.7  - 21.4  - 27.7  - 54.6  - 31.8 
Under    10  6 501  + 8.2  + 65.7  + 65.0  + 62.8  - 9.9  + 48.9 
   10  -    50  8 909  - 14.4  + 0.8  - 0.2  - 0.8  - 20.6  - 0.6 
   50  -    250  7 666  - 15.7  - 13.1  - 13.5  - 17.3  - 31.4  - 12.2 
   250  -    500  2 639  - 13.3  - 23.2  - 22.4  - 25.4  - 32.3  - 28.4 
   500  -   2 000  5 274  - 12.0  - 22.8  - 21.5  - 24.0  - 31.3  - 15.3 
  2 000 and more  6 787  - 7.8  - 22.5  - 21.3  - 11.1  + 108.8  - 9.5 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery   287  - 10.8  + 161.5  + 150.5  + 236.3  + 157.1  + 56.2 
Mining and Quarrying   230  - 13.6  - 19.7  - 19.9  - 25.3  - 25.6  - 39.1 
Manuf. of Intermed. / Non-Durable Goods  6 547  - 11.8  - 21.4  - 20.9  - 24.5  - 30.6  - 39.6 
Manuf. of Investment / Durable Goods  6 062  - 13.0  - 21.7  - 21.5  - 25.7  + 1.1  - 34.1 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  1 897  - 13.7  - 22.7  - 23.2  - 23.7  - 63.0  - 23.1 
Construction  1 261  + 0.6  - 6.8  - 8.1  - 7.2  + 107.8  - 5.6 
Trade, Maintenance and Repair  6 642  - 8.6  - 15.5  - 16.0  - 19.9  - 23.6  - 40.7 
Hotels and Restaurants   396  + 13.7  + 8.6  + 4.7  + 16.5  + 156.7  - 3.7 
Transport, Storage and Communication  1 267  - 10.7  - 15.0  - 23.4  + 9.9  + 42.3  + 8.0 
Financial Intermediation  4 296  - 9.2  - 20.0  - 16.9  - 30.1  - 11.7  - 34.8 
Real Estate and Renting  2 109  - 11.2  - 8.8  - 13.8  + 30.1  - 36.4  + 117.0 
Business Service Activities  5 568  - 4.9  + 23.8  + 25.8  + 29.3  + 28.4  + 87.4 
Public and Personal Service Activities  1 216  - 3.1  + 305.1  + 308.6  + 266.0  + 121.0  + 152.7 
Sole Proprietorships  3 996  + 18.9  + 143.8  + 144.1  + 127.4  + 30.2  + 58.5 
Partnerships  12 329  - 11.7  - 6.1  - 6.4  - 7.2  - 13.1  - 0.5 
Corporations  21 452  - 13.0  - 23.3  - 23.1  - 19.6  + 1.9  - 10.7 
5.00%
4 3.50% 3.63% 3.25% 2.93% 0.83% 1.83%
5) Basic federal tax rate
3)
Total
Increase (+) / Decrease (-) of Local Business Tax Revenues in %
By Legal Forms
By Profits Before Taxes in €
By Industries
By Number of Employees
1) Excluding modified rules for the determination of taxable profits.- 2) Including the abolishment of reduced basic tax rates for 
enterprises with low profits.- 3) Municipalities apply a multiplier, which is 390% on average, to their allocated share of the uniform 
basic tax.- 4) Reduced basic federal tax rates apply for enterprises with taxable income below € 72,500.- 5) Applied to 10 % of the 
value of business properties.
Source: Calculations based on the microsimulation model for business taxation BizTax.
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rates for businesses reporting profits in this range. The tightened profit determination rules 
may have a stronger impact on firms with high profits than on small firms and thus at least 
partly compensate these effects.16 
The remaining five hypothetical reform scenarios adopt the abolishment of the reduced basic 
tax rates for small firms from the actual business tax reform 2008. The resulting flat basic 
federal tax rate is chosen such that the total local business tax revenue is held constant. This 
makes the distributional effects of the reform options comparable. 
In the first of these scenarios, liberal professionals and farmers are integrated in the local 
business tax. The simulation results show that this reform increases the revenue from enter-
prises with low and medium profits up to €1,000,000. The percentage increase is highest for 
the profit category just above the allowance of €24,500 and below €50,000 (+127 %) and 
decreases with higher profit classes. This reflects the profit distribution of liberal profession-
als. As in the actual business tax reform 2008, the abolishment of the reduced basic tax rates 
adds to the increased revenue collected from small firms. In contrast, large enterprises benefit 
from the reduced basic federal tax rate (3.632 % instead of 5 %) that offsets the broader tax 
base and makes the reform scenario revenue neutral. Municipalities dominated by personal 
service industry or agriculture and forestry can expect higher local business tax revenues in 
this scenario. 
The local business income tax shows similar effects because it likewise includes liberal pro-
fessionals and farmers. As only operating profits are subject to taxes, almost no revenues are 
collected from companies with losses.17 The revenue neutral basic federal tax rate is 3.253 %. 
It is lower than in the scenario discussed before because the local business income tax is not 
deductible from the tax base. 
The comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) includes all financing expenses in the tax 
base. Thus, in contrast to the local business income tax, revenue is levied on companies with 
losses or with profits below the allowance of €24,500 if their earnings before interests and 
taxes (EBIT) exceed the allowance. This leads to a sharp increase in revenue especially from 
companies with reported losses. The basic federal tax rate can be decreased to 2.934 % due to 
                                                                          
16 For a detailed analysis focussing specifically on the German business tax reform 2008, including the changes 
to the corporation tax, see Bach, Buslei, Dwenger and Fossen (2007). 
17 A company that reports overall losses may still be subject to local business income tax if its operating profits 
are positive and above the allowance. Discussion Papers   717 
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the broader tax base. Again, large and profitable corporations benefit from this tax rate reduc-
tion. Taxes levied on the financial intermediation industry decrease by 30 %. 
The local business value-added tax additionally includes the sum of wages and salaries in the 
tax base. To compensate for the much broader tax base, the basic federal tax rate is decreased 
to only 0.832 % and the allowance is increased to €36,000 (see section 2.3). The inclusion of 
wages and salaries leads to an even stronger increase of revenue from enterprises making 
losses or profits below the allowance than the CBIT. The revenue from companies with more 
than 2000 employees more than doubles, while the revenue from companies with fewer em-
ployees decreases significantly. On the other hand, less tax is levied on companies with prof-
its above €1,000,000. This shows that the business value-added tax is clearly dominated by 
the sum of wages and salaries in comparison to the other components of the tax base, i.e. 
profits and financing expenses. In contrast to the other scenarios, revenues collected from the 
construction industry and hotels and restaurants more than double, while revenues from elec-
tricity, gas and water supply decrease by 63 %. 
The local property tax also sharply increases revenues from companies making losses or prof-
its below the allowance of €24,500, but not as much as the local business value-added tax. 
Again, less revenue is collected from firms with high profits. The revenue neutral basic fed-
eral tax rate is 1.832 %. In contrast to the other scenarios, taxes paid by the real estate and 
renting industry more than double. 
Table 4 shows the distributional effects of the reform scenarios with respect to regional cate-
gories. In the upper part of the table, the effects are first split by western and eastern Germany 
and second by cores of agglomeration, surrounding and rural areas. The lower part displays 
the effects by regions with high, medium or low local tax revenues per capita.18 The first col-
umn shows the distribution of local business tax revenues in millions of euro if the law of 
2007 is applied. The second column gives the local business tax revenue per capita in the 
different regional categories. Local business tax per capita is only €248 in eastern Germany 
versus €512 in western Germany, which reflects that eastern Germany still lags behind in 
terms of productivity and profitability. As the next column shows, the actual business tax 
                                                                          
18 The categories “core of agglomeration”, “surrounding area” and “rural area” refer to definitions by the Federal 
Office for Building and Regional Planning (2007). These definitions are also the basis for the categorisation by 
local tax revenue per capita, which was set up by the German Institute of Urban Affairs (Reidenbach 2007). Local 
tax revenues per capita are classified as low if revenues per inhabitant were less than 80 % of the average in the 
same type of municipality in the period 2002 to 2005, and high if revenues per inhabitant exceeded 120 %. Discussion Papers   717 
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reform 2008 decreases local business tax revenues in eastern Germany by 0.8 percentage 
points more than in western Germany (again, not taking into account the tax base broadening 
measures of this reform). The other five hypothetical reform options, which are revenue neu-
tral, all increase revenues in eastern Germany and decrease revenues in western Germany. 
This effect is strongest when the local business value-added tax is applied, which increases 
taxes collected in eastern Germany by 59 % and decrease those collected in western Germany 
by 7.2 %.  
Table 4  Revenue Effects of Reform Scenarios of the Local Business Tax in 2008  







































Germay, Total   37 777     458  - 9.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Western Germany
5), Total   33 629     512  - 9.1  - 1.2  - 0.9  - 2.3  - 7.2  - 2.5 
Cores of Agglomeration   17 752     753  - 8.3  - 6.6  - 4.9  - 7.5  - 12.9  + 0.6 
Surrounding Areas   8 956     396  - 9.8  + 5.4  + 4.5  + 3.6  - 11.4  - 5.9 
Rural Areas   6 920     355  - 10.2  + 4.1  + 2.6  + 3.4  + 12.5  - 5.9 
Eastern Germany
6), Total   4 151     248  - 9.9  + 9.2  + 7.6  + 19.5  + 58.5  + 20.7 
Cores of Agglomeration   2 198     325  - 9.0  + 8.6  + 9.1  + 14.7  + 11.2  + 21.1 
Surrounding Areas    738     264  - 13.3  + 3.5  - 0.2  + 18.3  + 57.0  + 9.6 
Rural Areas   1 214     169  - 9.4  + 13.6  + 9.5  + 28.9  + 145.1  + 26.6 
High Local Tax Rev. per Capita   18 909     892  - 10.0  - 11.1  - 10.3  - 12.3  - 21.5  - 7.0 
Med. Local Tax Rev. per Capita   12 638     392  - 8.7  + 9.8  + 9.6  + 8.8  + 11.7  + 3.0 
Low Local Tax Rev. per Capita   6 233     215  - 7.7  + 13.4  + 12.2  + 20.0  + 41.4  + 15.5 
Regional Categories
1)
Increase (+) / Decrease (-) of Local Business Tax Revenues in %
1) Local tax revenues per capita: low if revenues per inhabitant were less than 80% of the average in the same type of municipality in 
2002 to 2005, high if revenues exceeded 120% (Reidenbach 2007).- 2) Inhabitants at the end of 2005.- 3) Excluding modified rules for 
the determination of taxable profits.- 4) Including the abolishment of reduced basic tax rates for enterprises with low profits.- 5) Old 
federal states excluding West Berlin.- 6) New federal states including Berlin.
Source: Calculations based on the microsimulation model for business taxation BizTax.
 
 
Today, local business tax revenues are highly concentrated in cores of agglomeration in west-
ern Germany. In the reference scenario they account for 47 % of total local business tax reve-
nues. Except for the local property tax, the hypothetical reform options reduce this concentra-
tion by decreasing revenues in cores of agglomeration in western Germany and increasing 
revenues in rural areas, especially in eastern Germany. All of the five hypothetical reform 
scenarios decrease revenues in municipalities with high local tax revenues per capita and 
increase revenues in municipalities with low or medium revenues per capita, and the increase 
is relatively higher in the low than in the medium revenues category. This confirms that these Discussion Papers   717 
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scenarios distribute local tax revenues more equally across regions. The results are driven to a 
large extent by the inclusion of liberal professionals in the local business tax. Physicians, 
lawyers or tax counsellors, for example, are not necessarily concentrated in cores of agglom-
eration, but distributed quite evenly in surrounding and even rural areas, and would therefore 
contribute to revenues in these regions if they became liable to local business tax. 
5 Summary  and  Conclusion 
The taxation of local business to generate revenues for local governments is common in 
OECD countries. Local authorities usually have some discretion over the tax rate. The inter-
national comparison reveals that the composition of the tax base varies widely. Local business 
tax systems range from a pure profit tax in Luxembourg and Japan to an origin-based value-
added tax in Italy and Hungary, which includes interest expenses and the payroll in the tax 
base. France and some states in the USA tax fixed assets of companies at the local level. As 
general options for the design of local business taxation we identify a local business income 
tax, a local CBIT, a local business value-added tax, or a local property tax.  
Using our newly developed microsimulation model for the business sector BizTax, we simu-
late the distributional effects of these general reform scenarios if they were implemented in 
Germany in a revenue neutral way in 2008. Liberal professionals and farmers, who are e-
xempted from the local business tax in Germany today, are integrated in these reform scenari-
os. We find that today’s high concentration of local business tax revenues on corporations 
with high profits decreases if the tax base is broadened by integrating more taxpayers and by 
including more elements of value added. The reform scenarios with a broader tax base also 
distribute the local business tax revenue per capita more equally across regional categories, 
especially by reducing today’s high concentration of revenues on cores of agglomeration in 
western Germany. Revenues from local business taxation in rural areas and in eastern Germa-
ny increase.  
The results also show that the reform scenarios including components other than profits in the 
tax base strongly increase the tax revenues collected from companies incurring losses and 
from small businesses. This does not necessarily imply that these scenarios impose a higher 
tax burden on sole proprietors or partners of small businesses, however. The local business 
tax liability is not only a deductible expense in Germany, which reduces the income or corpo-
ration tax. Sole proprietors and partners can additionally credit it against their personal in-Discussion Papers   717 
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come tax in a lump sum. The business tax reform 2008 abolishes the deductibility from the 
tax base and compensates this by a higher lump sum credit for unincorporated firms. This 
credit would also apply to liberal professionals and farmers if they were integrated in the local 
business tax. This certainly increases the political feasibility of including these groups in the 
local business tax, and of a tax base broadening reform in general, but the tax credit under-
mines the fiscal equivalence principle. Furthermore, it decreases the transparency of taxation 
and brings about bureaucracy, and if the federal level is taken into account, the tax reform 
options are no longer revenue neutral. With or without the credit, a broadening of the tax base 
of the local business tax in the direction of an origin-based value-added tax or a property tax 
has the advantage of providing a revenue source for local governments which is more reliable 
and stable and better matches the needs for local service provision than Germany’s current 
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